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This article provides estimates of the probable saving in the resource cost of
complying with the tax law that would result from simplifying the individual
Abstract income tax law. These estimates are based on an econometric analysis of thetax-filing behavior in 1982 of a sample of Minnesota taxpayers. A simple model
of tax-compliance behavior based on utility maximization is first presented in
order to suggest the important determinants of compliance behavior. The
empirical model treats the discrete choices of whether to itemize deductions and
whether to hire professional tax advice, and the choice of how much time and
money to spend, conditional on the discrete choices made. Simulations based
on the econometric results suggest that significant resource saving could be
expected from eliminating the system of itemized deductions, although no
significant saving from changing to a single-rate tax structure can be
confidently predicted. Results suggest that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will, in
the long run, decrease the use ofprofessional tax assistance, but its net effect on
the use of taxpayer’s own time is unclear.





An analysis of any tax simplification proposal ought to
consider its effect on the cost of operating the tax system,
including both the administrative and compliance costs, along
with the distributional and efficiency implications of the proposal.
Brannon (1979) and Slemrod (1983) have argued that, in principle
at least, the resource costs of operation can be quantified and
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considered with the more standard equity and efficiency effects.
The principal obstacle to implementing this framework for
analysis has been the dearth of quantitative information about
the resource cost implications of simplification plans. Although
recent work by Slemrod and Sorum (1984) has provided useful
estimates of the total resource cost of the current U.S. income tax
system, what is more important for policy purposes is the
expected change in the resource cost due to a proposed tax
reform.
The purpose of this article is to provide information on the
determinants of the compliance cost of income taxation that can
be used to predict the probable resource cost savings from tax
simplification. These estimates are based on an econometric
analysis of the tax-filing behavior in 1982 of a sample of
Minnesota taxpayers. The article is arranged as follows. In
Section 2, a simple theoretical model of tax-compliance behavior
based on utility maximization is presented. The model is used to
suggest the important determinants of compliance behavior to be
considered in an empirical study and what the likely direction of
influence is. Section 3 develops an empirical model that estimates
the determinants of the choice of whether to itemize deductions
and whether to hire professional tax advice, and the choice of how
much time and money to spend on tax matters, conditional on
whether itemization was chosen and/ or professional assistance
was purchased. Section 4 describes the data for the analysis. In
Section 5, the results of the econometric analyses are presented
and discussed, and Section 6 briefly describes their implications
for the resource saving from some radical tax simplification
proposals and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Section 7 concludes.
2. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL OF
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR
The goal of this section is to construct a simple model of the
taxpaying household’s choices concerning its tax-filing behavior.
The household must choose how much of its own time to spend
5
on tax matters and how much, if any, professional tax advice to
purchase. It is assumed that both of these activities uncover
legitimate ways to reduce taxable income, and thereby reduce tax
liability. The model thus abstracts from the use of illegal
reductions in or deductions from taxable income.’ The decision
problem for a representative household can be stated as
where the notation is defined as follows:
A : nonlabor income
B hours of professional tax assistance purchased
C : consumption of composite good
D deductions from taxable income (not including payments for
professional tax assistance)
E : exemptions
H : hours of own time spent on preparing tax return
I : dummy variable equal to one for households that itemize
deductions and equal to zero otherwise
L : labor supply
PB : price per hour of professional tax assistance
R : reductions in taxable income
S : standard deduction
T : tax function
w : wage rate
y : labor-equivalent of one hour spent on tax compliance
According to Equation 1 a, utility is a function of consumption
of a composite good, labor supply, and hours spent on tax
matters. Equation lb states that consumption equals gross
income, which consists of exogenously given nonlabor income
and labor income, minus taxes paid and payments for profes-
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sional tax assistance. Taxable income is gross income minus
exemptions, which require no effort to uncover, reductions in
taxable income, and deductions from taxable income, which
equal (1 - I)S + I(D + PBB).
Consider a general compliance technology that embodies the
relationship between the level of tax liability that can be justified
and the inputs to the process. We represent this technology as
so that both the amount of reductions in taxable income and the
amount of deductions from taxable income depend on the
amount of own time spent on uncovering either, the amount of
professional assistance purchased, and a vector Z of other factors
including the type of tax return the household files, personal
characteristics such as age, level of education completed, and
attitude toward tax matters, and the tax law itself. Time and
money spent on uncovering and documenting deductions are
treated distinctly from resources spent on finding reductions in
taxable income because the former activities are worthwhile only
if the household chooses to itemize deductions, while the latter
may be worthwhile to any household that has a nonzero marginal
tax rate.
The household is faced with a joint decision problem. It must
make a discrete choice between itemizing deductions or not.
Conditional on that choice, it must decide how much labor to
supply and how much to expend on compliance, including its own
time and payments for professional tax preparers.
The household will choose whichever itemization status yields
the higher level of utility. Without considering compliance costs
this decision involves a comparison of S and D + PBB, where D +
PBB is to be interpreted as the amount of available deductions. If
D + PBB exceeds the standard deduction, S, then the household
would itemize deductions. However, in the presence of compli-
ance costs the choice is more complicated because it is no longer
costless to uncover and document the deductions.
7
The first-order conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker optimization
problem for the conditional choice of H, B, assuming that the
choice of L is interior, are
where t is the marginal tax rate, RH and RB are the marginal
reduction in taxable income generated by an hour of own time
and professional time, respectively, and DH and DB are the
marginal amount of deductions generated by own and profes-
sional time, respectively. Equation 3 states that (when H > 0) the
marginal payoff to own time, in terms of lower tax liability, must
equal the opportunity cost of that time. Equation 3b states that
(when B > 0) the marginal payoff to hiring professional assistance
must equal its cost. Note that the value of I enters the first-order
conditions in two separate ways. First, the marginal benefit of
uncovering deductions can be positive only if I is one. In addition,
the after-tax cost of professional tax advice depends on the
itemization decision because these expenses are deductible from
taxable income.
Differentiation of (3a) - (3b), detailed in an appendix to this
article available from the author, allows us to investigate the
effect on compliance behavior of changes in the marginal tax rate,
the net wage rate, and the itemization status when both H and B
are positive. An increase in the marginal tax rate directly
increases the payoff from reducing taxable income by a dollar.
For itemizers, it also decreases the cost of professional tax
assistance. The theory implies that both H and B will necessarily
increase only if H and B are complementary inputs in both
compliance technologies. Otherwise, it is conceivable that an
increase in t will induce a change in technique, so that either H or
B, but not both, will increase.
An increase in the after-tax wage rate, holding t constant,
increases the opportunity cost of own time spent on tax matters.
This leads to an unambiguous decline in H, but the effect on B is
not determinate. For nonitemizers, B will decline if it is comple-
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mentary with H in the taxable income reduction technology, and
increase otherwise. For itemizers, the response of B depends on its
complementarity with H in both the &dquo;deduction&dquo; and &dquo;reduction&dquo;
technologies.
A change to itemizing status has an effect similar to that of an
increase in the marginal tax rate. First of all, the payoff to
uncovering deductions (but not reductions) from taxable income
increases in proportion to the marginal tax rate. Second, the cost
of professional tax assistance declines, again in proportion to the
marginal tax rate. The impact of a change in I on H and B
depends, as in the case of the marginal tax rate, on whether H and
B are complementary inputs.
As we will see later, for many observations B equals zero and
(3b) does not hold as an equality. In this case, differentiation of
(3a) alone reveals that, as long as own time spent is subject to
locally diminishing returns, an increase in the marginal tax rate
will increase H, an increase in w( 1- t) will decrease H, and a small
increase in I will cause H to increase.
3. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We consider two distinct estimation approaches. The first
approach is to estimate reduced form equations for H and B using
ordinary least squares (OLS). We include all exogenous variables
as regressors plus a dummy variable for itemization status, and, in
an alternative version, also an interactive dummy variable. This
model has the advantage of transparency and direct inter-
pretability. At the same time, it ignores the statistical problems
that arise because of the endogeneity of the itemization decision
and the existence of a significant fraction of households that do
not hire any professional tax assistance. This first problem is
especially significant because one of the goals of this research is to
investigate the effect of eliminating the option of itemizing
deductions.
The second estimation approach is decidedly more ambitious.
We proceed by constructing a general linear model that can
accommodate all of the important aspects of the theoretical
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model and data structure. The model has three parts. In the first
part, we introduce an unobservable variable Ii*, which is a
measure (of arbitrary scale) of the difference between the
maximum utility attainable in the event that taxpayer i itemizes
deductions and the maximum utility attainable if deductions are
not itemized. We posit that I,*is a linear function of the
exogenous variables of the system, Zi, and append an additive
error term, &euro;,, which encompasses both optimization error and
unobservable variables that affect I,*, such as intelligence and
unknown characteristics of the taxpayer’s tax situation, so that
We make the standard assumption that f1 is distributed as a
standard normal variable. Equation 4 indicates that, although 1,*
is unobserved, the itemization decision is observed, so that we
know whether 1,* is positive or not.
The second part of the system models the decision of whether
to purchase professional tax advice, conditional on the itemiza-
tion status chosen. As with the itemization decision, it is posited
that there is a latent variable (called either J* 11 or J*N. for itemizers
and nonitemizers, respectively), which represents the propensity
to pay for professional advice.
As before,
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The error terms &euro;,, VII, and VN¡ will, in general, be correlated.
The third part of the system models the choice of H and B,
conditional on the outcome of the two discrete choices. A linear
representation of the first-order conditions (3a) and (3b) is
Itemizing Regime (111 = 1)
Not Itemizing Regime (Ili = 0)
Here XH and XB refer to the vectors of exogenous variables in the
H and B equations, respectively. The error terms in Equations
6a-6d may be correlated with the error terms in Equations 4, 5a,
and 5b. Note that when Jn is zero (no professional assistance
hired), (6b) is irrelevant and (6a) collapses to
Similarly, when JN, is zero, (6d) is irrelevant and (6c) reduces to
It is worth noting that the system outlined here is more general
than a &dquo;tobit&dquo;-type system in which one structural equation
determines both the probability that a household pays for
professional assistance and the amount spent, conditional on
spending any positive amount. In this more general structure, the
two decisions are allowed to respond differently to exogenous
variables. This differentiation is appropriate if, for example, there
are fixed costs involved in purchasing professional tax advice.
The existence of fixed costs is in fact reasonable, as the preparer
must become familiar with the return before the return can be
completed. For complicated and idiosyncratic returns with large
fixed costs associated with preparation, it is plausible that a
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taxpayer may be unlikely to hire professional advice, although-
if any assistance is purchased-a substantial amount will be
required.
It is well known that direct estimation of (6a) - (6d) by ordinary
least squares will yield biased coefficient estimates because the
expected value of the error term, conditional on the household
being observed in a particular itemization and professional
assistance regime, is generally nonzero and correlated with the
explanatory variables. Our strategy in this event is to utilize a
two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage is to estimate the
bivariate discrete choice model outlined above of whether to
itemize deductions and whether to hire professional tax assis-
tance, conditional on the itemization decision. In the second
stage, the estimates of the discrete choice model are utilized to
control for the self-selection biases in the estimation of the
simultaneous system of (6a) - (6d).
The first stage of the estimation begins with our stated
assumptions that both e. and VIi and also f1 and VN1 have a joint
normal distribution, and that each term has unit variance. Next
we divide the observations into four regimes as follows:
R1: I* > 0, JIi > 0 (itemize, hire assistance) [7]
R2 : I* > 0, J* < 0 (itemize, don’t hire assistance)
R3 : 17 ~ 0, J~i > 0 (don’t itemize, hire assistance)
R4 : I* 0, JNi ~ 0 (don’t itemize, don’t hire assistance)
If we denote the bivariate distribution function of and VI as fl (.,.,
pI) and the joint density of E and PN as fN (.,.,PN), the likelihood
function is
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We employ the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the
parameters V, 8’I, 6’N, pi, and PN.
As mentioned above, the results of the first-stage estimation
are to be used in the estimation of the parameters of (6a) - (6d). To








X, is now the set of all exogenous variables in (6a) - 6d), and the
vectors a’I and /3’1 are expanded to be compatible with X,.
The problem with estimating (9a) - (9f) by ordinary least
squares is that the error terms are not necessarily uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables, given the self-selection rules.
Fortunately, the estimates obtained from the bivariate probit
model allow us to form a consistent estimator of E(uOHI1I 11 = 1,
Ji, = 1) and of the other error terms in (9b) - (9f), conditional on
regime. Thus, in order to estimate the parameters of (9a), for
example, we utilize an ordinary least squares procedure for the
observations in Regime 1 that not only includes as explanatory
variables the union of XH and XB but also includes two other
variables that represent the conditional expected value of ei and
Yi,. Lee et al. (1980) have shown, in a similar model, that the
estimated standard errors from the ordinary least squares equa-
tions will underestimate the true standard errors, as their
calculation ignores the fact that ’/, 61, and pi are themselves
estimated.
4. DATA
The data for this study are drawn from a mail survey of
Minnesota households’ tax-filing behavior in 1982 sent to a
random sample of 2,000 Minnesota residents. Of the 653
questionnaires returned, 79 were eliminated from the sample
because of incompleteness of response or because the household
did not file 1982 income tax returns, leaving a total of 574 usable
responses. A detailed description of the data and survey proce-
dures is presented in Slemrod and Sorum (1984).
The questionnaire first requests some demographic infor-
mation, in particular the respondents’ sex, age, level of education
completed, income, employment status, occupation, and wage
rate or reservation wage. (In assessing this information, it is
important to realize that the cover letter pointedly asks that the
addressee refer the questionnaire to the &dquo;person in [the] household
most familiar with filing [the] income tax returns It then solicits
14
information about the household’s income tax return itself. The
taxpayer is asked which, if any, of the three federal tax returns
and which, if either, of the two Minnesota state tax forms was
filed. In addition, responses are sought concerning whether the
return featured itemized deductions, whether it was a j oint return,
and which of several sources of income were received. The
remainder of the questionnaire is devoted to collecting infor-
mation about the household’s cost of filing tax returns. This
section asks how many hours were spent during the year and
requests a breakdown of the hours into various categories. In
addition, any money spent on tax assistance or otherwise spent in
filing returns is solicited.
A subset of the information collected in the survey was used in
this study. The precise definition of the variables considered is as
follows:
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
H: total hours spent on tax matters
B: total dollar expenditure on professional tax assistance
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
AGE: age of respondent
AGESQ: age squared
EDU: years of education completed
MAR: dummy variable equal to one if respondent is married;
equal to zero otherwise
EASY: dummy variable equal to one if tax return did not
contain any dividends, interest, self-employed business
income, capital gains, rental income, pension, annuity,
or other income; equal to zero otherwise
INT: dummy variable for presence of interest income
DIV: dummy variable for presence of dividend income
SEBUS: dummy variable for presence of self-employed business
income
CAPGL: dummy variable for presence of capital gains or losses
RENT: dummy variable for presence of rental income
PENANN: dummy variable for presence of pension or annuity
income
OTHER: dummy variable for presence of &dquo;other&dquo; income
TIMEVAL: value of time (per hour), measured as after-tax wage
rate or reservation wage
TAX: marginal tax rate applicable to deductible expenses,
expressed as a fraction
The interpretation of most of these variables is clear; some,
however, merit further comment. Responses to the age and
education question were in ranges. Each taxpayer was assigned
the midpoint of the indicated range. Those indicating &dquo;over 65&dquo;
were assigned an age of 70, and those indicating graduate-level
education were assigned 18 years. The marginal tax rate was
calculated from information about income reported by the
taxpayer. The calculation takes into account both the federal and
state income tax and the possible deductibility of one tax in the
calculation of taxable income for the other level of government.
Because a usable wage rate was not supplied on 46% of the
returned questionnaires, a wage equation was estimated for those
who did supply a usable answer and used to impute a wage rate
from those who did not.2 The exogenous variables in this
equation were the income level, employment status, occupation,
age, level of education completed, marital status, and sex. The
marginal tax rate applied to the gross wage is the same as that
described above plus the social security tax.
All of the exogenous variables listed above are included in the
vectors Z and XH. The vector XB includes all of the above except
TIMEVAL.
5. RESULTS
The results of the ordinary least squares estimations are
presented in Table 1. Two separate reduced-form equations were
~timated for both own time spent and for professional assistance
~rchased. One version (denoted A) includes all the exogenous
~ables plus a dummy variable for itemization status (ITEM).
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The second version (denoted B) includes all these variables plus
an interactive dummy term that is equal to the product of TAX
and ITEM, called TAXITEM. This particular interactive term is
included because of the fact that, for itemizers only, the tax rate
affects not only the return to reducing taxable income by one
dollar but also directly affects the effective price of professional
assistance.
The results in Table 1 indicate that households with more
complicated returns (as measured by the presence of various
sources of income) spend more time and money on tax matters.3
Particularly strong associations exist between compliance cost
and the presence of self-employed business income and capital
gains or losses. Households with both sources of income spend
approximately 32 hours and $65 more than households with
neither source of income. The value of time variable is estimated
to have a significant positive association with monetary expense
and a positive but not significant effect on own hours spent. The
theory would suggest that a high value of time should induce
substitution away from own time toward professional advice. The
fact that time spent is positively correlated with the after-tax rate
may be due to the fact that it is a better measure of competency in
tax matters than educational attainment, so that higher-wage-
rate people have both a higher opportunity cost of time and a
higher return to investing their time working on their tax return.
In both Version A and B of the model, the estimated effect of
the marginal tax rate on hours spent is positive, though not
statistically significant. On the other hand, the regression equa-
tions do pick up a strong positive relationship between the tax
rate and the amount of professional assistance purchased. This is
apparent in Version A, where an increase in the tax rate of 0.1 is
associated with $16 more spent. In Version B, this association is
shown to be present only for itemizers, but is very large ($21 more
with an increase of 0.1 ) and significant for that group.
Finally, we note that, in Version A, the dummy variable for
itemization is positive and at least marginally significant. Th~
magnitude of the implied effect is large. Itemizers are estimated .......
spend 8.8 more hours on tax matters and $24.30 more. In Vers~~
B, the estimated impact of itemization depends on the marg~-~
17
TABLE 1




NOTE: Standard errors are In parentheses.
*Slgnlflcant at 90% confidence level ; **slgnlflcant at 95% confidence level.
tax rate. For a tax rate of 0.3, the estimated impact is approxi-
mately the same as in Version A.
Table 2 contains the results of estimating the more general
model outlined in detail in Section 3.4 In the first three columns
are the results of estimating the bivariate probit model of the
choices of whether to itemize and whether to hire professional
assistance, conditional on itemization status. The results of
within-regime, ordinary least squares estimates with sample
selection bias correction terms are presented in the last six
columns.
The estimates of Table 2 indicate that the presence of a very
simple return (EASY = 1) has a significant negative association
with the probability of hiring professional help for itemizers and,
for itemizers who pay for help, a negative association with the
amount of own time spent on tax filing. Few other relationships
approach statistical significance. Having self-employment income
(SEBUS = 1) is positively associated with hiring professional help
for itemizers and has a strong positive effect on own time spent for
itemizers who pay for help and on the amount of professional
assistance purchased for all who purchase any help at all. Having
capital gains or losses (CAPGL =1) has a strong positive relation-
ship only with the amount of professional assistance purchased
by itemizers.
19
The results also indicate that while TIMEVAL does not
significantly affect the probability of purchasing assistance, it is
strongly positively associated with the amount purchased for
itemizers and positively, but not significantly, related to the
amount purchased for nonitemizers. The effect of TIMEVAL on
own time spent is mixed. A higher value of TIMEVAL increases
the likelihood of being an itemizer, which is associated with
higher H. Given the regime, TIMEVAL has an insignificant
positive association with H, except for the nonitemizing, zero B,
households, for whom there is a strong negative relationship.
A higher marginal tax rate increases the likelihood of itemizing,
and increases the likelihood of purchasing professional assistance,
though for itemizers only. In addition, for itemizers, the amount
of professional assistance purchased is positively associated with
the marginal tax rate.
The bottom of Table 2 reports the coefficients of the two
selectivity variables for each equation. In each case the first listed
selectivity variable is the expected value of the error term in the
itemization probit equation (ei), conditional on the regime
chosen. The second listed selectivity variable is the expected value
of the error term in the professional assistance probit equation (VIi
for itemizers, and VN¡ for nonitemizers), conditional on the regime
chosen. The estimated coefficients on the selectivity variables are
large relative to the unadjusted standard errors only in the H
equation for households in Regime 4 (nonitemizing, not paying
for professional assistance). The negative signs of the estimated
coefficients indicate that there will be a tendency to underestimate
H when either the probability of itemization or the probability of
paying for professional assistance is overestimated.
The interpretation of the coefficients of each of the two
selectivity variables is the estimated covariance between the error
in the two relevant probit equations and the error in the ordinary
least squares equation. The inner product of the two coefficient
estimates and the expected value of the error terms is the estimate
of the expected unobservable component. For each of the six
equations, this value is very large in absolute value compared to











































































~ ’tJ G ....::J ’tJ
E a..... ~
E wo E cu m
~ III ’tJ Q) 11B
U 11B +’ III














I ’qy: S /BI1 5~ Q)
m CM ~ Q)
..~:~
IJJQ)&dquo;’&dquo;(0r III 00E 41 UZ ~ ~ *
22
the unobservable component of tax-filing behavior, for both time
and money spent, is very large compared to the component
explained by the independent variables. In several cases these
coefficients imply implausible predicted behavior of a taxpayer in
a regime other than the one in which he or she is actually
observed.
The large standard errors of the coefficients of the sample
selection bias correction terms suggest that these implausible
predictions are due to the multicollinearity of the estimate of the
unobserved component of the choice of regime decision and the
determinants of the conditional continuous choice of H and B.
Remember that the same set of exogenous variables explains both
the choice of regime and the compliance behavior conditional on
regime. That the two relationships may be identified is entirely
due to the nonlinear relationship of the sample selection bias
correction terms with the explanatory variables. In sum, the
estimation technique is unable to distinguish precisely between
the effect of the unobservable influences that determine the choice
of regime and the effect of the explanatory variables that affect
behavior within a regime.
What conclusions can be drawn from the regression results
presented in Table 1 and 2? Although the results from the two
estimation approaches are not in all cases consistent, some clear
findings do emerge. First, the presence of certain sources of
income causes greater expenditure of time and money on tax
compliance. This is especially true for self-employment income,
and is also observed for capital gains income. A higher value of
time, which we expect to be associated with a substitution away
from own time to the use of professional assistance, is positively
associated with the use of professional assistance in the simple
OLS equations of Table 1, but when the regimes are separated,
this effect is found only for itemizers. The estimated effect of the
marginal tax rate on compliance behavior is somewhat mixed.
Neither of the techniques indicates a strong positive association
between the tax rate and the amount of one’s own time spent on
tax matters. The regressions do reveal, however, a positive
association between the marginal tax rate and the expenditure on
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professional tax assistance. The probit estimates imply that, at
least for itemizers, a higher tax rate increases the likelihood of
purchasing assistance. Furthermore, for itemizers who do pur-
chase assistance, the amount of assistance purchased is positively
associated with the marginal tax rate.
6. THE EFFECT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION
ON COMPLIANCE COST
Slemrod (1985) uses the preceding econometric results to
simulate the likely impact on compliance cost of (1) eliminating
the system of itemizing deductions and (2) installing a &dquo;flat-rate&dquo;
income tax system. Here the basic simulation findings are
reported, and the reader is referred to the other article for details.
Simulations based on both empirical models indicate that
eliminating the system of itemized deductions would be ac-
companied by a substantial reduction in expenditures on profes-
sional assistance, ranging from 28% to 39%.5 The percentage of
taxpayers who use professional assistance is predicted to decline
by 12.6 percentage points. The models have different predictions
about the impact on taxpayer time spent. While the OLS models
of Table 1 predict a decline of per-taxpayer hours of slightly more
than 3, the regime-by-regime estimates with endogenous regime
selection predict a slight increase of 0.5 hours per taxpayer. Both
models predict that the total resource cost of compliance would
decline, although the decline is large only using the OLS estimates
( 15% to 20%). In sum, not itemizing deductions would apparently
save some hours of record keeping and also eliminate the primary
reason that many people seek professional help. In addition, it
increases the net price of professional tax assistance from ( 1- t)PB
to PB for former itemizers. Because current itemizers account for
64% of payments for assistance in the weighted sample, the
substantial increase in price that accompanies the elimination of
itemization apparently would have a large aggregate impact.
The simulations indicate that although moving to a flat-rate6
tax system without itemizing would entail less resource cost than
the current system, the move to a flat rate would not by itself
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reduce the aggregate cost of compliance by very much, if at all.
Although the OLS results indicate a small increase in both
aggregate hours spent and professional assistance purchased if
the tax schedule is flattened, the more general model predicts a
small decline in both time and money spent when the rate
schedule is changed. Compared to the policy of eliminating only
itemization, the change in the resource cost of compliance is
estimated at between a 2% saving and a 6% additional cost.
These results are relevant to understanding the impact of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, because the new law changed the
income tax system in the direction of both of these simulated
reforms. As a result of raising the standard deduction, eliminating
the deductibility of sales tax and (eventually) personal interest
payments, and subjecting miscellaneous deductions to a floor, the
fraction of taxpayers who itemize will fall by about 7%. Further-
more, the structure of rates was significantly flattened, with the
top rate reduced from 50% to 28%. Because these two aspects of
the new law are partial moves toward eliminating itemization and
instituting a flat tax, the simulation results suggest that, in the
long run, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will reduce the use of tax
professionals below what it otherwise would be, although no
significant reduction in the amount of taxpayer time spent on tax
matters can be predicted with confidence. In the short run,
however, both the reliance on tax professionals and taxpayer time
will likely rise as the public adjusts to the new income tax system.
Other aspects of the new law have implications for the
compliance cost, some simplifying (e.g., eliminating the two-
earner credit and income averaging) and some complicating (e.g.,
limiting IRA and interest deductions), and the net effect on
compliance cost is not clear. Including expenses on professional
tax assistance in miscellaneous deductions that can be deducted
only to the extent they exceed 2% of AGI will, by increasing the
marginal cost of tax advice for some taxpayers, reinforce the
conclusion that the use of professional assistance will tend to
decline in the long run.
There is one potentially significant reason that these results
may underestimate the resource savings to be derived from a
change to a flatter-rate schedule. It is that the analysis assumes
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that the taxpayer’s sources of income do not change when the
marginal tax rate changes. To the extent that the current rate
structure induces individuals to engage in income-earning acti-
vities that require a relatively high cost of compliance, the
estimates presented here will underestimate the resource savings.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Microeconomic data of the kind analyzed in this article are
potentially a rich source of information about tax-compliance
behavior. This analysis of tax simplification suggests that signif-
icant resource savings can be expected from eliminating the
system of itemized deductions, although no saving from changing
to a single-rate tax structure can be confidently predicted.
Information about the likely resource savings of a particular
tax simplification scheme is properly seen as one input of many
that should be considered by policymakers. The allocational and
distributional impact of the changes must be weighed as well. It is
hoped that this research can begin the task of enriching the debate
about tax simplification by bringing quantitative evidence to bear
on its benefits and costs.
NOTES
1. For models of tax evasion, see Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Cross and Shaw
(1981, 1982).
2. Although there is a substantial literature concerned with imputing wage rates to
nonworking individuals based on their characteristics and the wage rate and characteristics
of working individuals, direct application of that methodology to the problem at hand
seems inappropriate, because there is no clear distinction between those for whom a wage
rate is available and those for whom it is not available. (Examples of unusable replies to
the wage-rate question are "time-and-a-half," "retired," or "variable." Others left the
answer space blank.) Thus it is invalid to claim that the reservation wage of those with no
wage rate available (because they are not working) must be greater than the wage rate that
could be earned. The fact that TIMEVAL is estimated for some taxpayers is not taken into
account in the calculation of the standard error of the regression estimates.
3. In interpreting the coefficients of the sources of income variables, it is important to
bear in mind that EASY takes on a value of one only when none of the sources of income is
26
present. Thus, for example, the estimated impact of having dividends, compared to having
no nonwage income, is found by subtracting the coefficient of EASY from the coefficient
of DIV.
4. The standard errors reported in the last six columns of Table 2 are not adjusted for
the fact that the selectivity variables are estimated. Thus claims of statistical significance
cannot be supported. In the subsequent text, I refer to an estimate as being statistically
insignificant if the estimated coefficient is less than its unadjusted standard error. It is
unlikely that the corrected standard errors would alter this assessment.
5. Because the results of Table 2 indicate implausible predictions of behavior of
taxpayers who change regimes, the simulation results are based on the bivariate probit
estimates of Table 2 and OLS estimates of within-regime behavior estimated without the
selectivity terms. See Slemrod (1985) for details.
6. The policy simulated institutes a flat federal tax rate of 20% (which is approximately
equal yield) and does not change the state tax system. Note that a switch to this system
would not reduce all taxpayers’ marginal tax rate. On the contrary, many low-income
individuals would face a higher rate.
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